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STUDENT MATERIAL

Student Note

TEACHERS' UNION AND EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS: A
SURVEY OF WEST VIRGINIA LAW
I.

INTRODUCTION

West Virginia is a relative newcomer in the management of public labor
disputes.' Unlike some of its more industrialized neighbors, 2 the state has been
largely spared the torment and disruptive effects of job actions by government
workers. The only major public employee strike this state has confronted in
recent memory was dealt with swiftly and severely by Governor Moore 3 after a
brief interruption of vital public services. But the relationship between government and its workforce in this state is changing. Public bodies can no longer
rely on their employees to forego grievances for fear of the kind of retaliation
meted out by Governor Moore. All categories of public workers are becoming
restive with a system which permits them no active voice in setting wages or in
improving working conditions; and nowhere is this more apparent than in
education.
It has been slow in coming, but the 26,000 public school teachers in West
Virginia have begun to flex their political muscle. Low salaries, overcrowded
classrooms and demanding parents have forced educators to shed their images
as demure scholars in favor of the scowling masks of militant reformers.
Teachers have donned their "hardhats," so to speak; they have organized their
membership into a hardhitting union, formed a very effective political lobby
and, on occasion, used the force of their numbers to extract concessions from
elected officials.
So far teachers have utilized conventional avenues to press their demands
for better wages and classroom conditions. This tactic has produced some significant victories, particularly in the areas of job security and procedural pro' Because Congress exempted state and local governments from the National Labor Relations
Act, West Virginia, like other states, is left to its own devices in managing public sector labor
relations. See, e.g., NLRB v. National Gas Utility Dist., 402 U.S. 600 (1971). Unfortunately, the
state has not yet seen the need for a formalized system of labor management.
2 Several of West Virginia's neighbors have been especially hard-hit by teacher strikes. Pennsylvania, for example, recorded an astounding 267 separate teachers strikes for the period 1972
through 1980. For the same period, Ohio recorded 116 teachers strikes and Illinois reported 176.
PUBLIC SERVICE RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EFFECT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON TEACHER SALARIES

12 (1981).
' See Kirker v. Moore, 308 F. Supp. 615 (S.D. W. Va. 1970), af'd, 436 F.2d 423 (4th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 824 (1971), for a description of Governor Moore's reaction to a winter
strike by Department of Highways workers.
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tections.4 But it has also resulted in some notable setbacks. Teachers' salaries,"
for example, still lag far behind other jurisdictions and there is no indication
that the gap is closing. With the deepening recession and the decline in the
coal industry, West Virginia's economy has been crippled to the point that
teachers may face several successive years without a pay increase.
At some point, the combination of unresponsive administrators and poor
wages will force teachers to abandon the tactic of persuasion in favor of confrontation. Rather than working within the political process, educators may
find that more disruptive measures, such as strikes, are necesary to bring about
desired changes. Before conditions reach this flashpoint, it is important to understand the range of concerns troubling those in the teaching trade. From
such an understanding, constructive proposals may emerge which can avert the
burgeoning confrontation between teachers and government. This Note will
hopefully contribute to that process by focusing on the rights of teachers in
both the classroom and the larger educational system.
II.

PERMISSIBLE LIMITS OF UNION ACTIVITIES

A. The BargainingRights of Teachers
West Virginia has no formalized system of collective bargaining for public
school teachers, or for any other category of public employees. Unlike many of
its counterparts,' the state has resisted the movement toward managed labor
relations in public education, in favor of a system which leaves decisionmaking
largely in the hands of elected officials.7 Because this system operates at both
the state and local levels, it is a source of great frustration for teachers and
county officials.
While permitting elected officials wide participation in educational decisions arguably serves the interest of democratic government, it also creates
some very real difficulties for teachers who seek better working conditions.
These difficulties can best be understood by illustrating the struggle teachers
face in achieving something so basic as a pay increase: Under present law, the
state legislature has reserved the power to set teacher salaries.8 If county officials want to supplement salaries with local resources, they are free to make
that choice, so long as local tax levy ceilings are not exceeded.9 For teachers to
impact on the salary decision, then, they have to join the battle on two levels;
Golden v. Board of Educ., 285 S.E.2d 665 (W. Va. 1981).
West Virginia ranks 44th among the states in terms of average teacher salary. Even more
alarming, during the decade 1970-1979, there were only three states in the country which increased
teacher salaries at a slower rate than West Virginia. NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS,
AVERAGE ANNUAL SALARIES OF CLASSROOM TEACHERS IN PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS
BY STATE, U.S. DsP'T OF EDuc. (1980).
6 There are at least 31 states that have enacted legislation to formalize a system of collective
bargaining. See Gee, The Unionizationof Mr. Chips:A Survey Analysis of Collective Bargaining
in the Public Schools, 15 WMLIAmETTE L. REv. 367 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Mr. Chips].
W. VA. CODE § 18A-4-1. (1977).
8 W. VA. CODE § 18A-4-2 (Supp. 1982).
W. VA. CODE § 18A-4-5 (Supp. 1982).
8
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at the statehouse and at the local school board. At the state level, the parties
which must be convinced are politicians with varied constituencies, including
many who may be disserved by a teacher pay hike. Compounding the task further is the sheer number of people who must be persuaded. Teachers face a
bicameral legislature with a combined membership of nearly one-hundred. 10 To
be successful, teachers must secure the votes of a majority of each house, plus
the acquiescence, if not the support, of the governor - and that is only the
first level of the battle. From there, they must persuade fifty-five county school
boards to make acceptable adjustments in their respective salary supplements.
As this illustration demonstrates, "bargaining," such as it exists at the
state level is really a cousin of "interest group" lobbying.1 Teachers formulate
their set of demands, gather whatever resources they have available and make
the journey to Charleston each winter, where they line up with the hundreds of
other "interest groups" for a share of the state "pie." Depending on the political clout they enjoy at the time, or the friends they can make on critical committees, the teachers may succeed in securing a modest salary increase or other
concessions; but only after running the gauntlet of compromise and "horsetrading" that is so ingrained in the political process. The inefficiencies of this
system are legion, but the greater tragedy is that it does not work. The system
simply fails to address the broad range of issues which are important to teachers and leaves too many unresolved disputes to fester.
"Bargaining" also takes place on the county level in West Virginia,1 2 and it
is here that teachers potentially can have a significant impact. Rather than
dealing with a large, unmanageable collection of politicians, they are confronted by five individuals whose only governmental responsibility is to operVA. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
1 West Virginia's teachers number 26,105 and are supported by non-professional staff of

'o W.

15,305. By sheer numbers, educators constitute a potent political force in this state. Highly educated and politically astute, they can turn the tide in both statewide and local elections.
12Despite the manageability of negotiations on the local level, teachers can expect only marginal benefits even from the most accomodating school boards. In West Virginia, virtually all the
important decisions are governed by state statute and cannot be contravened by local officials.
Teachers' salaries, for example, are set by the state legislature. W. VA. CODE § 18A-4-2 (Supp.
1982). Although local boards may supplement salaries from tax revenues, the tax assessment rates
are statutorily set, often binding boards of education to prior year funding levels. Counties can
gain extra revenue to finance salary supplements through a special tax levy, but this requires a
special election and the acquiescence of 60% of the qualified voters. W. VA. CODE 18-5-15 (Supp.
1982). (The 60% requirement was recently lowered to 50% by constitutional referendum. The
Legislature may still, however, choose to impose a higher approval rate than is constitutionally
required.) Moreover, a special assessment expires in five years and must be renewed at another
special election. At a time when voters are strapped with high interest rates and inflation, not to
mention suspicions about the quality of education being provided in our schools, the special levy
option gives local board members little flexibility to meet teacher demands.
State preemption of local prerogatives is also evident in other areas. The number of instructional days, for example, is set by statute, W. VA. CODE § 18-5-15 (Supp. 1982), as are the major
parts of the school calendar, the maximum student-teacher ratios, the term of teachers' contracts,
W. VA. CODE § 18-2-2 (1977), and the amount of sick pay and personal leave. W. VA. CODE § 18A-410 (Supp. 1982). State control is so prevalent that even minute details such as duty-free lunches
and planning periods are controlled by statute. W. VA. CODE § 18A-4-10 (Supp. 1982).
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ate the schools in accordance with the directives of the state legislature and
their own consciences. Superficially, at least, conditions are ideal at the local
level for fruitful negotiations between educators and school officials. Yet the
processes of negotiation are as confused here as they are at the state level.
The primary cause of the confusion is that the system of negotiation is not
formalized or structured. Where it exists at all, the process has evolved into
something different in every county. Teachers may enjoy a good rapport with
school board members in one school district,13 while in others the relationship
may be abysmal, with the parties unable to meet face-to-face, much less enter
into meaningful discussions.
In addition to lack of structure, the local bargaining process is further undermined by the participants' uncertainty about the nature and extent of their
roles. This uncertainty flows, in large part, from contradictory pronouncements
from public agencies about the rights and duties of those engaged in bargaining. A prime example is the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals' decision
14
in City of Fairmont v. Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union.
In Fairmont,the court faced a range of questions about public employee
union activities, including the government's duty to bargain. In a very carefully
crafted opinion, Justice Miller acknowledged that workers in the public domain enjoy the protections of the first amendment. They can form unions, petition their employers for improved working conditions and, in limited circumstances, strike, all within the protections of the Constitution. They may not,
however, force the .government employer to lend an attentive ear to their demands. Under Justice Miller's opinion, public agencies are relieved of any duty
to meet and confer with employees over the terms and conditions of employment. The decision to turn a deaf ear to demands for better pay and benefits is
a prerogative of sovereignty, according to Miller, and the judiciary will not interfere with the government's right to pursue such a policy.' 5
For teachers, the Fairmont decison is particularly distressing. Although
the court recognized the organization rights of all public workers, including
teachers, it quickly undermined the ability of these employees to affect their
employment destiny by freeing local officials of the duty to bargain. Teachers,
and all other categories of public employees, gain little by the right to speak on
important employment matters, if there is no forum in which they can be
heard. As the experience in the private sector has shown, the duty to fairly
consider all proposals is essential to a bargaining process which hopes to avert
disruptive confrontation." The failure of the court to impute such a duty to
local officials not only emboldens them to harden their positions against union
demands, but it may push the workforce toward more reckless action to get the
"3 For a very good discussion of collective bargaining options in West Virginia, see Kincaid,
Resolving Public Employment Disputes: A Guide for West Virginia, 79 W. VA. L. REv. 23 (1976).

283 S.E.2d 589 (W. Va. 1981).
15283 S.E.2d at 593.
"

10See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) and NLRB v. Insurance
Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1969) for a discussion of the role the duty to bargain plays in
private sector labor disputes.
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attention of government officials.
To compound the damage done by the supreme court's decision, teachers

must also reckon with school boards whose power to voluntarily bargain is severely circumscribed. In a 1974 opinion letter,17 which is the latest and most
authoritative declaration on voluntary bargaining, the Attorney General of
West Virginia concluded that school officials could not legally engage in collective bargaining with teacher unions, even if they did so by choice. Definitionally, the Attorney General explained, collective bargaining would ascribe a
number of options to teachers which are forbidden by state law, not the least
of which is the right to strike if negotiations fail. Since only the legislature can
cleanse such options of the "taint of illegality," school boards are powerless to
engage in a process which may encourage teachers to step outside the law to
press their demands for better working conditions. 18
On the positive side, the Attorney General did recognize school officials'
power to engage in meaningful "negotiations" with teachers. These powers in-

clude the ability to meet and confer with teacher representatives, the option to
recognize a union as the exclusive bargaining agent of the teachers, the authority to allow neutral fact-finding and third party mediation to resolve outstanding disputes, and the capacity to enter into contracts with teacher unions with

respect to the terms and conditions of employment.'9 Furthermore, the Attorney General acknowledged that teachers have an important role to play in edu-

cational decisions, a role, he emphasized, that can only improve the school system's ability to achieve its assigned mission. The Attorney General let teachers
down, however, by not identifying how this role can be gained. The favorable
language about the benefits of negotiation means little when, in the next
breath, he makes it clear that the decision to include teachers must come from
school officials. 20 They are still the powerbrokers and, unless they can be con-

55 Op.Att'y Gen. 300 (W. Va. 1974).
" The Attorney General was also wary of collective bargaining because of his fear that a
school board might impermissibly delegate authority to non-elected officials. As he stated in his
opinion, "the final determination of wages, hours, working conditions and the like, rest with the
particular government unit and cannot be delegated away." Id. at 308 (citing 51 Op. Att'y Gen.
683, 689 (W. Va. 1966)).
The Attorney General's fear is not without foundation. In West Virginia, the state legislature
is constitutionally charged with the duty to provide a system of public education and, in discharging that duty, the legislature has chosen county boards of education to administer the schools.
These boards are creatures of the state. Their functions and powers are governed by statute and
may only be exercised in the manner prescribed. They have no implied power, except that which is
reasonably necessary to accomplish their assigned mission. See Evans v. Hutchinson, 214 S.E.2d
453 (W. Va. 1975). So long as these boards "negotiate" with teachers, the ultimate authority for
decisionmaking remains with school officials. But, when "negotiation" matures into a formal contract, the danger exists that the board may have relinguished its power to non-governmental individuals. Any contract which included such a delegation would be unenforceable. See Stone v. Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 280 N.J. Super. 430, 435 A.2d 143 (1981); Board of
Directors of Maine School Administrative Dist. No. 36 v. Maine School Administrative Dist. No.
36 Teachers Ass'n, 428 A.2d 419 (Me. 1981); Richards v. Board of Educ., 58 Wis. 2d 444, 206
N.W.2d 597 (1973).
19 55 Op. Att'y Gen. 300 (W. Va. 1974).
20 The Attorney General's Opinion is not dispositive of the collective bargaining issue. In West
17
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vinced of the benefits of negotiation, teachers are without any rights in the
process.
Taken together, the Attorney General's opinion and the later supreme
court decision in Fairmont cannot be hailed as significant victories for teachers. Nor, for that matter, do they contribute to the rationalization of the public
bargaining process. In practical terms, the Attorney General and the supreme
court have left the field of collective bargaining as they found it - in disarray.
Still, the opinions are far from expressions of anti-employee sentiment. Both
the court and the Attorney General agree, for example, that teachers and other
public employees have a constitutional right to associate in unions and to use
lawful processes to further their collective demands. A careful reading of the
decisions also reveals a shared recognition that public sector bargaining can
yield important benefits for employees and government. On these points, at
least, the court and the Attorney General line up squarely with the interests of
the public workforce.
B.

The Teachers' Strike Option

The court's ruling that government agencies are under no legal duty to
recognize and bargain with unions leaves public employees in a dilemma.2 1
However legitimate their grievances about pay, working conditions, or benefits,
they have no guaranteed forum in which to petition for changes. If the public
employer ignores their concerns, the employees are without a vehicle to force
the agency to act in good faith or to come to the bargaining table with new
proposals.
Increasingly, public workers in this state are choosing to confront the government employer rather than foresake legitimate demands. So far this confrontation, with one notable exception, 22 has been confined to isolated workstoppages and sickouts. But it is only a matter of time before public employees
choose more disruptive tactics to press their demands for better working conditions. Since teachers are the best organized of all the categories of public workers, the problem is likely to surface first in education. It is important, then, to
explore whether educators even have the strike option in West Virginia. Necessarily, this discussion must proceed as if the teachers' strike rights are identical
to those of the public workforce at large. The topic must be treated in this
broad context because the only caselaw available deals with the subject on this
same plane. Hence, if the discussion seems universalized at times, rest assured
that it is intentional.

Virginia, such opinions are not controlling precedent. They may serve as guideposts for the judiciary, but they do not have the force and effect of law. See State v. Wassick, 156 W. Va. 128, 191
S.E.2d 283 (1972); Walter v. Ritchie, 156 W. Va. 98, 191 S.E.2d 275 (1972).
21 City of Fairmont v. Retail, Wholesale & Dept. Store Union, 283 S.E.2d 589 (W. Va. 1981).
2 Kirker v. Moore, 308 F. Supp. 615 (S.D. W. Va. 1970), afl'd, 436 F.2d 423 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 824 (1971).
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1. Common Law Rule
23
Public employee strikes are unlawful under common law, for reasons relating to outdated notions of sovereign authority and disproved theories about
the disruptive effects of such strikes. Beginning with the United States Su24
preme Court decision in United States v. United Mineworkers of America,
public employee workstoppages have been viewed as insidious attempts to influence government by crippling essential services. Striking employees have
been harrassed, disciplined and even discharged for daring to challenge govern25
ment's authority to run the "business" of the people the way it chooses. Common law states uniformly condemn employee actions which challenge government authority, disrupt essential services or seek to coerce public officials,
26
regardless of the validity of the grievances being advanced.

Recognizing the failings of the common law rule, most states have enacted
27
statutes which define the permissible boundaries of employee job actions.
28
The majority still prohibit vexatious strikes, but they have replaced the
strike option with a comprehensive system of collective bargaining which usually includes arbitration. A smaller number of states have completely repudiated the common law rule, permitting public employees the right to strike
29
when public health and safety are not jeopardized. As the Air Traffic Controllers' strike illustrates, the federal government is not among those jurisdictions
30
which has altered its views on the evil of public employee work stoppages.
23 See Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Abney v. City of Winchester, 558 S.W.2d
662 (Ky. 1977); Board of Educ. v. Asbury Park Educ. Ass'n, 145 N.J. Super. 495, 368 A.2d 396
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976), modified, 155 N.J. Super. 76, 382 A.2d 392 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1977); Goldberg v. City of Cincinnati, 26 Ohio St. 2d 228, 271 N.E.2d 284 (1971).

2' 330

U.S. 258 (1947).

See Kirker v. Moore, supra note 22; Farrelly v. Timberland Regional School Dist., 114 N.H.
560, 324 A.2d 723 (1974) (tenured teachers are stripped of employment when they engage in an
illegal strike); Board of Educ. v. Sussex County Vocational Technical Teachers Educ. Ass'n, 170
N.J. Super 426, 406 A.2d 989 (1979) (teachers who violate injunction to return to work may be
discharged).
" See City of Manchester v. Manchester Teacher's Guild, 100 N.H. 507, 131 A.2d 59 (1957);
Board of Educ. v. Redding, 32 MII.2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965).
27 See Gee, Mr. Chips, supra note 6.
2 See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. I § 6; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-475, 10-153(e) (Supp. 1982);
VA. CODE. §§ 40.1-54.2 (1981); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.02 (Baldwin 1977); WIs. STAT. ANN. §
111.89 (West Supp. 1981).
29 ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1977); HAWAn REv. STAT. § 89-12 (Supp. 1976); PA. STAT. ANN.,
tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (Purdon Supp. 1982); VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 21, § 1730 (Supp. 1978).
30 Congress has long recognized the potential dangers that can arise from public employee
strikes. During the heyday of union activities, it expressly prohibited any job actions against a
federal agency. See United States v. UMWA, 330 U.S. 258 (1947). Under present law, the Congress
not only prohibits strikes, but it also forbids a federal employee from associating with an organization of employees that he knows asserts the right to strike against the government of the United
States. 5 U.S.C. § 7311(4) (1980). Although Congress' power to prohibit public employee strikes
has been upheld, the broader proscription against even associating with a group which espouses
the right to strike would seem to run afoul of the first amendment's free association provision. See
United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879, aff'd, 404 U.S. 802 (1971).
11
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2. West Virginia's Position on Right to Strike
For some time, West Virginia was thought to follow the common law rule
on the right to strike.s In a 1970 federal case, 32 for example, Judge Field upheld the firing of over 3,000 highway department employees because they engaged in an illegal work stoppage. Although the judge cited no specific authority, he concluded that West Virginia was a common law state and would follow
the accepted rule that public employee strikes are unlawful. As recently as
1974, West Virginia's Attorney General agreed with the federal court's description of West Virginia law on the strike question. In the previously discussed
opinion letter on teachers' bargaining rights,3 3 the Attorney General stated
baldly that strikes by public employees are illegal in West Virginia. To support
his position, the Attorney General cited a provision of the West Virginia Constitution which preserves the common law in this state,3 ' unless expressly
changed by the legislature. Since that body has never acted either to prohibit
or legitimize the strike option, the Attorney General reasoned, the common law
rule proscribing strikes controls in this jurisdiction.
Eight years after the Attorney General's opinion, the legislature still has
not spoken on the strike option, except in relation to teachers' sick pay and
leave benefits.3 5 In an obscure recent amendment, the legislature does expressly prohibit a teacher from using these benefits "in connection with a concerted work stoppage or strike."'8 But it does not pass on the strike's underlying lawfulness.
The most definitive statement that has yet been made on the legality of
public employee strikes came from the supreme court in the earlier discussed
Fairmontdecision.37 In that case, it will be recalled, the court ruled that hospital workers were not engaged in illegal activity when they staged a one day
work stoppage against their municipal employer. To the court, the job action
was peacefully executed and was not designed to turn away clients or bar nonstriking personnel from engaging in work. Absent a breach of contractual duty,
then, the employees had done nothing which would entitle the hospital to recover damages against the responsible union. In short, the workers' job action
31

Kirker v. Moore, supra, note 22.

3" Id.
3See

supra, note 17.

§ 13 provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this article, such parts of the common law, and of the
laws of this State as are in force on the effective date of this article and are not repugnant thereto, shall be and continue the law of this State until altered or repealed by the
4 W. VA. CONST. art. VIH

legislature.

The original construction of this section of the Constitution strictly adhered to the view that
only the legislature could change the common law. State v. Abrogast, 133 W. Va. 672, 57 SE.2d
715 (1950). The supreme court has since moved away from a literal interpretation of the section,

holding that the courts have historic power to alter the common law in light of present societal
conditions. See Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666 (W. Va. 1979); Markey v.
Watchel, 264 S.E.2d 437 (W. Va. 1979).
"W. VA. COD § 18A4-10 (Supp. 1982).
"6 Id.
-1 283 S.E.2d 589 (W. Va. 1980). See supra text accompanying footnotes 14-16.
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was not "illegal" by the court's definition of that term.
Fairmont undeniably moved the court away from the common law prohibition against strikes. Just how far down the road it has traveled, however, is
still unclear. Justices McGraw and Harshbarger left little doubt about their
views on the breadth of the strike option, saying, in their concurrence, that "a
peaceful strike by public employees is legal in West Virginia."38 But their characterization of Fairmont'sholding is too generous. The plurality opinion never
directly states that public workers may engage in strikes. In fact, the language
of the opinion deliberately avoids a sweeping statement indicating court support for a "right-to-strike."3 9 To restrict the breadth of its opinion, the plurality even recasts the fundamental controversy in the case to focus on the employer's common law recovery rights against a striking public union, rather
than the legality of the underlying job action.
Still, the implication of the court's decision cannot be masked by vague
language or clever machinations. Had the court not embraced the principle
that some public employee strikes are lawful, the result in Fairmont would
have been impossible to reach. Before celebration turns to rash action, however, teachers and other categories of public workers must recognize the narrow dimensions of the strike option. A union, for example, which struck in
violation of an employment contract would fall outside the protective umbrella
of Fairmont. This is of particular importance to teachers, since they can only
be employed by contract. Similarly, a union which pursued its job action
through illegal means, such as trespass or physical coercion, would likewise
find Fairmont unaccommodating. Finally, a workstoppage which interfered
with the operations of a government agency or with the employment rights of
co-workers could not invoke Fairmontto shield its participants from the sting
of the state's reprisals.
3.

The Discharge Threat

Teachers should be wary of the "strike option" because of the federal
court decision in Kirker v. Moore.40 A district judge there upheld the power of
West Virginia's governor to discharge striking State Department of Highways
workers who had walked off the job during a late winter storm. As previously
mentioned, the judge categorized West Virginia as a common law state with
respect to public employee strikes. When the employees defied their government employer, the judge explained, the Governor had "the right, if not indeed

:8 283 S.E.2d at 597.

9 The court's express holding in Fairmont was that:
Where public employees who have no employment contracts with their employer, engage
in a work stoppage which is peaceful and directed only against the employer with no
attempt to interfere with his customers or bar ingress to other employees there is no
common law right to damages.
Id. at 590.
40 308

F. Supp. 615 (S.D. W. Va. 1970), 436 F.2d 423 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 824

(1971).
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the responsibility""1 under common law to terminate their relationship with
the state.
The decision in Kirker v. Moore is important because it is the only judicial
statement in West Virginia on the power of government bodies to discharge
striking workers. It stands alone as a harsh reminder of the price public employees may pay if they rashly test the authority of the state. But, and this
must be emphasized, it is not conclusive on the discharge question. Kirker v.
Moore was rendered by a federal court interpreting an unclear area of West
Virginia law. Its conclusions and findings are therefore not binding on the
courts of this state.4 2 While the decision may serve as a guidepost, the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals is free to reject the Kirker v. Moore rationale and set a different course for dealing with striking public employees. 4
Indeed, the court's decision in Fairmont44 already indicates movement 'away
from Kirker's blanket condemnation of public employee strikes. In Fairmont,
it will be recalled, the supreme court recognized a qualified right to strike for
public employees. Where the action is peaceful, violates no contract obligations
and is not designed to disrupt vital public services,
a strike by public employ5
ees is not necessarily illegal in West Virginia.4
The Fairmont decision obviously casts doubt on Kirker v. Moore's bold
statement that all public employee strikes are illegal.' But this does not mean
that the importance of Kirker may be entirely discounted. The state supreme
court has yet to rule on whether the government's power to discipline striking
employees is as expansive as Judge Field's opinion in Kirker indicated. Until
this issue is squarely addressed, the public workforce, and teachers particularly, should exercise restraint in organizing job actions, because the threat of
retaliation still looms large in West Virginia.
C. Picketing Rights of Teachers In Non-Strike Setting
No less than any other citizen, a school teacher is entitled to the full range
of protections afforded by the first amendment. 7 She may associate with her
colleagues in a union,'48 comment critically upon public issues without fear of
41
42

Id. at 623.
See Nature Conservancy v. Machipongo Club, Inc., 579 F.2d 873 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,

439 U.S. 1047 (1978).
43 Id.
" 283 S.E.2d 589 (W. Va. 1980).

283 S.E.2d at 590.
Id.
47 See Madison Joint School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Rel. Comm., 429 U.S. 167 (1976)
(teachers have a right to discuss educational matters at board of education meeting if open to
other members of the public); Mount Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)
(teacher cannot be discharged for making public internal school memorandum when disclosure
violates no school policy); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (teacher has right to
comment publicly on important issues, even though utterances are adverse to board of education's
official position).
48 In Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, 441 U.S. 463 (1979), the United States
Supreme Court recognized public employees' first amendment rights to organize into labor unions.
The Court went on to hold, however, that "the first amendment does not impose any affirmative
45
46
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reprisal,49 and address the school board in a public forum about issues related
to salary levels, classroom conditions, or general education policy.50 In limited
circumstances, she may even bring her protest into the school building, provided the educational process is not disrupted.51 As the United States Supreme

Court has restated many times, a teacher may not be "compelled to relinquish
the First Amendment rights [she] would otherwise enjoy as a citizen" 52 merely
because of her employment in the public domain. Nor, the Court has further
admonished, can the state or its subdivisions operate schools without obeying
"the transcendent imperatives of the First Amendment."5 "
Among the freedoms protected by the first amendment is the right to engage in peaceful picketing. Since Thornhill v. Alabama," the United States
Supreme Court has consistently recognized that picketing is a form of selfexpression which is shielded from unwarranted government invasion. Like all
forms of self-expression, the state is not always powerless to regulate the activity. Indeed, the Court has expressly upheld the power of the government to

prohibit picketing which disrupts vital public servicess5 or which is undertaken

to accomplish an unlawful purpose.5 8 But such regulation, even when appropriate, must be 57necessary to achieve a weighty public interest and be very narrowly drawn.
Peaceful picketing, off school property, by public school teachers is neither
a threat to public safety, nor to the educational process. Hence, the state and

its subdivisions would have difficulty justifying broad restraints on the rights
of teachers to express themselves through this means. The courts have pro-

tected teachers' first amendment rights to refuse to recite the Pledge of Alleobligation on the government... to recognize the association and bargain with it." 441 U.S. at
465.
" Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
50 Madison Joint School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Rel. Comm., 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
51 In Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), the United States Supreme
Court struck down a school policy which prohibited students from wearing black armbands to
express their opposition to the Vietnam War. Such a policy, the Court explained, placed an unnecessary restraint on the students' right of expression, without a demonstration that the conduct
"materially and substantially interfere[d] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
school." Id. at 509. The language important to teachers was the Court's general conclusion that
neither students nor teachers "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression
at the schoolhouse gate." Id. at 506. The Court went on to acknowledge that the special needs of
the educational process would always be a factor in the reach of teachers' and students' first
amendment rights, but it left little doubt that certain forms of nondisruptive expression, such as
armbands, badges, etc. are certainly protected. See Diamond, The First Amendment and Public
Schools: The Cage Against JudicialIntervention, 59 Tax. L. Rav. 477 (1981), for some adverse
commentary on the Tinker decision.
52 Madison Joint School District, 429 U.S. at 175.
53 Board of Educ. v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982).
310 U.S. 88 (1940); see also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Gregory v. Chicago, 394
U.S. 111 (1969).
15 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (prohibition against picketing or demonstrating near
courthouse upheld).
56 Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957) (where a "union shop" is prohibited by state
law, picketing designed to accomplish that unlawful purpose may be restricted).
11 Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. at 470.
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giance, 5 to keep personal affiliations with political groups secret, 9 to criticize a
public school administrator about school policy in a face-to-face confrontation, eo and to speak openly with school officials in a public forum.61 With such
an unshakable commitment to protecting the self-expression rights of educators, the courts are unlikely to countenance any blanket restrictions on teachers' rights to engage in peaceful picketing.
The tougher problem, from a constitutional vantage point, is the extent to
which teachers can take their picketing to the school grounds. Like any other
government entity, a board of education does have the power to place reasonable restrictions on the public's access to property under its control.2 The fact
that the property is publicly owned does not mean that every person or group
in the community is entitled to unregulated usage. Nor does it mean that reasonable restrictions must necessarily give way when they collide with constitutional rights.63 Where the issue has arisen in the "free expression" context, the
United States Supreme Court has upheld the agency's authority to mute public speech when the restrictions are applied uniformly, designed to achieve a
significant public interest and are not directed at the "content" of the message
being advanced. 6'
Assuming a school board adhered to these standards, it could constitutionally prohibit teachers from picketing or demonstrating in classrooms or hallways during normal school hours. Presumably, a teacher discharged for violating such a policy would not be able to claim that the school restrained free
speech as a ground for gaining reinstatement.
The result would be different, however, if the school property was used as
an outlet for public commentary. In evaluating any restraints on picketing in
this setting, a tribunal would have to apply the United States Supreme Court's
more rigorous "public forum" test.65 The fact that the restrictions were "content neutral" and "reasonable" would not save them under "public forum"
analysis. School officials would also carry the burden of demonstrating that the
restrictions advanced a very substantial government interest,66 that they were
the least restrictive means of advancing that interest,6 and that the proponents of the message had alternative avenues of reaching the desired audi" Russo v. Central School Dist., 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973).
11 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
60 Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
61 Madison Joint School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Rel. Comm., 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
62 Id.
"See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (military base may prohibit groups from conducting peaceful demonstrations on government property); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (prison warden may restrict inmates' rights of association and
solicitation, even if purpose would otherwise be lawful); United States Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh
Civic Ass'n., 453 U.S. 114 (1981) (Congress may restrict access to mail boxes, even though "use" is
related to freedom of expression).
"United States Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Ass'n., 453 U.S. 114 (1981).
" Id.

" Id.

67 Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
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ence.6 s The difficulty in justifying restraints on free speech rights under these
standards would obviously afford teachers greater protection from possible
school board retaliation. 9

III.

PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS

While teachers have suffered some setbacks on the union front, they have
nevertheless enjoyed considerable success in extending the reach of their procedural and substantive employment rights. These triumphs have been primarily achieved in the court system, where recent decisions have strengthened
due process protections, 7 0 expanded avenues of appeal from local board decisions 7 1 and narrowed the grounds for discharge.7 2 To a lesser extent, teachers
have also won important protections from the state legislature. Just recently,
for example, the state gave probationary teachers the right to a "statement of
reasons" when a board decides not to renew their contracts.7 3 The "statement
of reasons" protection is especially important, because it gives the nontenured
teacher the ability to discover whether the adverse decision was based on a
stigmatizing factor, such as imcompetency or immorality. She can then use this
information to challenge the correctness of the board's judgment through the
administrative framework and, ultimately, through the courts. If the decision
was wrong, she can remove this blemish from her employment record before it
permanently jeopardizes her professional standing.
With few exceptions, teacher successes have come at the expense of school
boards. Most of the important recent decisions have chipped away at local prerogatives by requiring more uniformity in personnel practices and by providing
greater judicial oversight of board operations.' While some may lament the
loss of local control these decisions have wrought, the court's interventions, in
many cases, have been justified, if not long overdue. Its ruling on teacher im-

"Consolidated Edison Co. v. P.S.C., 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
Madison School Dist., 429 U.S. 167 (1980).
70 See Wayne County Bd. of Educ. v. Tooley, 276 S.E.2d 826 (W. Va. 1981).
See Leef v. Via, 293 S.E.2d 442 (W. Va. 1982).
See Golden v. Board of Educ., 285 S.E.2d 665 (W. Va. 1981).
73 W. VA. CODE § 18A-2-8(a) (Supp. 1982) provides in part:
Any probationary teacher who receives notice that he has not been recommended for
rehiring or other probationary employee who has not been reemployed may within ten
days after receiving the written notice request a statement of the reasons for not having
been rehired and may request a hearing before the board. Such hearing shall be held at
the next regularly scheduled board of education meeting or a special meeting of the
board called within thirty days of the request for hearing. At the hearing, the reasons for
the nonrehiring must be shown.
7' In two recent decisions, Mason County Bd. of Educ. v. State Superintendent of Schools, 274
S.E.2d 435 (W. Va. 1981) and Trimboli v. Board of Educ., 254 S.E.2d 561 (W. Va. 1979), the court
has ruled that, in cases involving incompetency, the teacher is entitled to an objective evaluation of
her performance and an opportunity to correct any deficiencies. These steps are mandatory on all
local school boards and noncompliance will result in a reversal of any decision adverse to the
'
71

teacher's interest.
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morality,75 for example, finally provides local officials with some direction on

the weight to be given out-of-school behavior in the employment decision.
Granted, the trade-off for this direction has been a loss of discretionary authority; but it is a bargain, nevertheless, that those concerned about teachers'
employment rights welcome.
Collectively, the court's recent rulings have dramatically changed the employment relationship between school boards and teachers. Whether these
changes have made the school system a better place to work will become
clearer as this discussion unfolds.
A.

Source of Employment Rights

A public school teacher can only be employed by the local board of education upon the recommendation and nomination of the superintendent.7 The
terms and conditions of her employment must be reduced to contract and retained on file with the local school board.7 Initially, the duration of the contract may be for no "less than a year nor more than three years. 7 8s But if, after
three years of successful employment, the board renews the employment relationship, the teacher retains her position under a continuing contract.79 Commonly called "tenure," this species of contract cannot be terminated except by
written resignation of the teacher or by majority vote of the full school board.80
Statutorily, the school board is restrained from taking such a vote without
good cause and without providing the teacher the fundamental protections of
due process.8 1 Minimally, these protections must include a statement of reasons for the decision, an opportunity to be heard on the charges, and the decision of an impartial tribunal.82
71 The court confronted the morality issue in Golden v. Board of Educ., 285 S.E.2d 665 (W.
Va. 1981).
'a W. VA. CODE § 18A-2-1 (1977).
77 State ex rel. Hawkins v. Tyler County Bd. of Educ., 275 S.E.2d 908 (W. Va. 1980).
7$ W. VA. CODE § 18A-2-2 (1977).

79Id.
80

Id.

§ 18A-2-2 (1977) provides in part:
The continuing contract of any teacher shall remain in full force and effect except as
modified by mutual consent of the school board and the teacher, unless and until terminated (1) by a majority vote of the full membership of the board before April first of the
then current school year, after written notice, served upon the teacher, return receipt
requested, stating cause or causes, and an opportunity to be heard at a meeting of the
board prior to the board's action thereon ....
82 The court has said that the procedural protections which must be afforded to public employees depend upon (1) the personal interests that will be affected by the state's decision; (2) the
risk of erroneous deprivation of the employee's property interest through the procedures used and
(3) the government's interest in the proceeding and the administrative and financial burdens imposed by additional due process requirements. Waite v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 241 S.E.2d 164, 165
(W. Va. 1977).
Where the court has applied the Waite standards, it has favored the employee's employment
interest over the state's interest in controlling administrative costs. In Evans v. Board of Regents,
271 S.E.2d 778, 781 (W. Va. 1980), for example, the court noted that a medical student could not
be denied readmission after a temporary leave of absence without: (1) written notice of the rea81 W. VA. CODE
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During the term of their employment contracts, tenured and probationary
teachers enjoy roughly the same rights. They are both acknowledged to have
important property interests tied up in the contract and they are both protected against the arbitrary deprivation of these interests.8 3 But this blurring
of identities ends with the expiration of the contract. A tenured teacher at this
point has a legitimate expectation of reemployment. State law guarantees her a
continuing contract, terminable at her choice, save for egregious misconduct or
lack of need."4 Her expectational interest rises to the level of an entitlement,
5
recognized by West Virginia law, and deserving of due process protection.
Any effort to end the teacher's employment relationship must be founded on
just cause and must go forward in strict compliance with the procedural safeguards contained in the West Virginia Code.86 In contrast, a probationary
teacher does not enjoy the same expectation of renewal. She can point to no
provisions of the educational statute which define her right to reemployment,
established precedent, she therefore has no protectable property
and, under
8 7
interest.
Still, the probationary teacher is not totally at the mercy of the school
board when her contract is up for renewal. She may have important liberty
interests intertwined with the decision not to rehire and, hence, be entitled to

sons; (2) a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal; (3) an opportunity to have counsel present;
and, (4) the right to present evidence and to cross examine witnesses. The court determined that
the burdens these procedural requirements placed upon the state paled in comparison to the property interest the medical student had at stake.
83 See Mason County Bd. of Educ. v. State Superintendent of Schools, 234 S.E.2d 321 (W. Va.
1977); Burks v. McNeel, 264 S.E.2d 651 (W. Va. 1980); Beverlin v. Board of Educ., 216 S.E.2d 554
(W. Va. 1975).
" W. VA. CODE § 18A-2-2 (1977).
85 In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the United States Supreme Court ruled
that the source of the property interest protected by the fourteenth amendment was state law. To
enjoy the protections of due process, the individual must have a "legitimate claim of entitlement"
to the property interest. Id. at 577. "An abstract need or desire" is not enough. Id.
Teachers who qualify for continuing contracts obviously have an identifiable property interest
in their einployment and, hence, meet the "legitimate claim of entitlement" standard. See Mason
County Bd. of Educ. v. State Superintendent of Schools, 234 S.E.2d 321 (W. Va. 1977).
86 Mason County Bd. of Educ. v. State Superintendent of Schools, 234 S.E.2d 321 (W. Va.
1977).
67 The blanket statement that probationary teachers have no protected property interest in
their employment must be qualified. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has ruled that
"tenure-like" rights can accrue to probationary teachers when they meet the objective requirements of tenure. See State ex rel. McLendon v. Morton, 249 S.E.2d 919 (W. Va. 1978); See also
Major v. DeFrench, 286 S.E.2d 688 (W. Va. 1982) for an explanation of McLendon. Hence, a public
school teacher who has completed her third year of employment with satisfactory performance has
met the objective requirements for tenure. If school officials refuse to rehire her for the fourth
year, then, under the court's McLendon rationale, they must show that they have cause for the
decision and, presumably, must provide the affected teacher with the same procedural rights afforded a fully tenured employee.
Although McLendon involved teachers in the college system, its reasoning spills over into all
levels of public education. Practically speaking, the high court has expanded tenure to include
those who perform their teaching duties satisfactorily and who are accepted for a third year of
employment. This effectively shortens the statutorily prescribed tenure period by one year and
significantly enhances the rights of many probationary teachers.
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due process protections. s8 To illustrate: If the board decision not to re-employ
is based on a judgment about the teacher's competency or moral character, she
not only loses her present position, but the opportunity to compete for future
appointments as well. The board action becomes a "scarlet letter" upon the
employment history of the probationary teacher which will plague her entire
professional life. She may find a job in another school district, but she will
never be on the same competitive footing as her unmarked peers.
Wisely, the courts have recognized the important personal and professional interests threatened by public decisions which stigmatize.89 They have
determined that these interests merit constitutional protection and have afforded those who face public censure procedural safeguards.9 0 To the courts,
the guiding purpose of these safeguards must be correctness of judgment. A
public body can certainly dismiss those who are incompetent or guilty of illegal
acts. But it may not place the stamp of disgrace on one of its employees without insuring its judgment is accurate.9 1
B.

The Narrowing Grounds for Discharge

The grounds for which a teacher may be discharged are set by state law. It
would not be accurate to say "limited by state law," for the range of impermissible conduct is very broad. According to the language of the education statute,
a teacher can be released from her contract for everything from intemperance,
to willful neglect of duty, to immorality.9 2 Still, her position is much more secure than a private sector worker, who, in most cases, serves at the will of her
employer. Excluding those who have unionized to protect their jobs, a nonpublic worker can be terminated for good cause, no cause, or even bad cause,
provided the decision is not based on factors such as race, sex or national origin. " ' In contrast, a teacher can only be removed for good cause - and even
" In Roth v. Board of Regents, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the United States Supreme Court recognized that a teacher's reputational interest is protected by the due process clause. If the decision
not to renew a probationary teacher's contract is made in a way that stigmatizes, then the affected
employee is entitled to notice and hearing.
Unfortunately, the courts have not been willing to give a broad definition to the liberty interest recognized in Roth. In many cases, the courts have not allowed employees to defend themselves
against even the most stigmatizing charges, because either the charges were not communicated to
the public or the employees were not released from employment. See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426
U.S. 341 (1976), and Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). The definition given to the liberty interest

has been so narrow that some federal courts have ruled that a discharge decision made on the
grounds of incompetency is not stigmatizing to a degree that warrants due process protection. See
Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hosp., 537 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1976); Paige v. Harris, 584 F.2d 178
(7th Cir. 1978).
9 See generally, Clemons v. Daugherty County, Slip Op. No. 81-7536 (11th Cir. Sept. 7,
1982); Vanelli v. Reynolds School Dist., 667 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1982). But c.f., Harrison v. Ayers,
673 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1982); Robertson v. Rogers, 679 F.2d 1090 (4th Cir. 1982).
90 Id.

91 Id.
92 Under

W. VA. CODE § 18A-2-8 (1977), a teacher may be discharged for immorality, incompetency, cruelty, insubordination, intemperance or wilful neglect of duty. The fact that the teacher
is tenured does not affect the school board's power to fire a teacher guilty of these offenses.
'3 There are many federal and state laws which protect the private sector worker from adverse
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then, she must be afforded the full range of due process safeguards.
The teacher's employment position has been further strengthened by the
construction given to the term "cause" by the judiciary. Recent decisions of
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals have narrowed the definition of
the term and, hence, limited the school board's discharge power. Nowhere has
the court's impact been greater than in cases involving allegations of teacher
incompetency or immorality.
1. Immorality As Cause for Discharge
The supreme court squarely faced the issue of teacher immorality in
Golden v. Board of Education.9 4 In Golden, a high school guidance counselor
was fired after pleading nolo contendere to a shoplifting charge. On appeal, the
court set aside the board's decision, rejecting the premise that an illegal act,
albeit immoral, is sufficient ground to deny a teacher her livelihood. Although
it is true, the court explained, that a teacher has a special role in shaping the
minds and behavior of students, this role alone does not justify holding her to
a higher code of conduct than the public at large. The proper inquiry in dismissal cases, the court went on, is whether the act, once proved to be immoral,
bears a "rational nexus" to the duties the teacher must perform in the classroom. Immorality is not enough; the school board must demonstrate the connection between the teacher's offense and her job responsibilities.
Golden's "nexus" test is likely to incur the wrath of board members and
parents. As Justice Neely argued in his dissent, the decision ostensibly removes
a community's ability to enforce a moral environment in which the education
process can go forward. Parents are accustomed to viewing public schools as
ministeries, where children pursue their educational endeavors under the
watchful eyes of the "pure of spirit." They are not likely to be enamoured with
employment decisions made on the basis of certain immutable physical characteristics. The
broadest is, of course, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which makes it an unlawful
practice:
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1964).
Workers 40 years old or more enjoy essentially the same protections, as provided under Title VII,
for discrimination based on age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. H 1978). A private employer
can no longer arbitrarily replace its older workforce with a younger version without running afoul
of the Age Discrimination Employment Act of 1967. Similar protection is also provided to handicapped workers under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Under §§ 793 and 794 of that Act, federal
contractors and federal financial recipients are prohibited from discriminating against the physically disabled in employment decisions. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1976 & Supp. H 1978); 29 U.S.C. § 794
(1976 & Supp. II 1978). Although the Rehabilitation Act covers fewer employees than those afforded protection under Title VII and the ADEA, it is still a powerful means of enforcing the
handicapped worker's employment rights.
West Virginia law makes many of the same practices illegal under the Human Rights Act, W.
VA. CODE § 5-11-1 to -19 (Supp. 1982). That statute provides a system of administrative enforcement designed to vindicate an employee's rights when she feels an employer has acted
discriminatorily.
285 S.E.2d 665 (W. Va. 1981).
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a decision which could open the classroom and their children's minds to the
persuasions of misdemeanants.
Below the surface, however, the Golden decision is not quite so outlandish.
The court still acknowledges a community's legitimate interest in the moral
character of its teachers and permits school boards the authority to vindicate
this interest in a limited number of circumstances. Golden simply attempts to
protect teachers againt Salem-style "witch-hunts" in which the guilty and innocent alike are sacrificed in the flames of moral indignation. The decision
does not require a school board to retain a convicted sex-offender as the coach
of the girls basketball team, or an alcoholic as the head of the chemistry lab.
But it does prevent the school board from passing judgment on the lifestyles of
its faculty. Implicitly, at least, the decision recognizes that teachers who live
together outside of marriage, use mild drugs in the privacy of their own homes,
or view patently obscene adult films are not, by virtue of these acts alone, unfit
to enter the classroom. To the majority, at least, educators are not engaged in a
ministry, nor have they taken vows of poverty and chastity. So long as their
personal conduct does not find its way into the classroom, teachers are free to
make the same mistakes in life as the rest. of the community.
2. Incompetency as Cause for Discharge
A school board's power to make an independent judgment about a
teacher's competency has been the subject of a series of recent decisions by the
state supreme court. Beginning with Trimboli v. Board of Education,5 the
court has consistently expressed disfavor with the way the competency issue
has been approached at the administrative level. Of particular concern has
been the school board's expansive interpretation of its discharge authority and
its persistent disregard of state personnel regulations. To lessen the confusion
on the competency issue, the court has evolved a series of standards to guide
local officials. Underlying these standards is a judgment, by the court, that
correctable incompetency is not grounds for dismissal under West Virginia law.
If a teacher's skills can be rehabilitated through further education or greater
supervision, then the court's recent pronouncements would forbid her discharge without first providing the opportunity to demonstrate improvement. 9s
Using State Department of Education Regulations 97 as a guide, the court
has evolved a set of standards which must be followed by school officials before
."9

254 S.E.2d 561 (W. Va. 1979). See also Wayne County Bd. of Educ. v. Tooley, 276 S.E.2d

826 (W. Va. 1981); Wilt v. Flanigan, 294 S.E.2d 189 (W. Va. 1982).

" Id.
" The primary source of the court's recent rulings on teacher competency is West Virginia
Board of Education Policy No. 5300(6)(a). That policy provides:
(a) Every employee is entitled to know how well he is performing his job, and should
be offered the opportunity of open and honest evaluation of his performance on a regular
basis. Any decision concerning promotion, demotion, transfer or termination of employment should be based upon such evaluation, and not upon factors extraneous thereto.
Every employee is entitled to the opportunity of improving his job performance prior to

the terminating or transferring of his services, and can only do so with assistance of
regular evaluation.
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an educator can be fired for incompetence.9" First, the teacher's job performance must be fully and fairly evaluated by capable staff.9 Under the supreme
court's recent rulings, this evaluation can only be conducted by supervisory
personnel, familiar with the demands of the classroom and the skills of the
teacher. 10 0 Board of education members are not permitted to make the initial
determination of competency. They must stay their judgment until the matter
is brought to their attention by the superintendent. 10 1
Second, the teacher must be notified of the results of the evaluation and
provided an opportunity to improve performance. 102 The court has not set the
length of this improvement period, but it should probably vary in accordance
with the nature of the deficiency and the experience of the school teacher.
Someone in her first year in the classroom, for example, should not be expected to conquer disciplinary problems in a week. A teacher with twenty years
in the schools, on the other hand, can be expected to correct lesson plan deficiencies relatively quickly.
Finally, after the improvement period has ended, the teacher must be reevaluated by equally qualified supervisory staff.103 Presumably, if she has
shown improvement in the trouble areas, she cannot be discharged for incompetency even though her performance is still not optimal. If the re-evaluation
shows no improvement or insignificant improvement, then the superintendent
may recommend that the school board terminate the teacher's employment.' 0'
At this point, the school board is free to make its first independent assessment
of the educator's qualifications.
The court has extended the "fair evaluation" and "improvement period"
requirements to all board employees, including probationary teachers, substitutes and non-professional personnel.10 5 In recent opinions, the court has also
ruled that no decision on competency is valid unless these standards have been
met. 106 Substantial compliance is not enough. 10 7 The board must strictly follow
the recently announced standards to exercise its statutory power to discharge.108 Moreover, where compliance is a close question, the case must be
resolved in favor of the teacher.10 9 A school board must therefore carefully doc98 Trimboli v. Wayne County Bd. of Educ., 254 S.E.2d 561 (W. Va. 1979).
99 Id.
100 Mason County Bd. of Educ. v. State Superintendent of Schools, 274 S.E.2d 435 (W. Va.

1981).

101Id. at 439.
102 Id.
103 Wilt

v. Flanigan, 294 S.E.2d 189 (W. Va. 1982).
W. VA. CODE § 18A-2-8a (Supp. 1982).
105 See Leef v. Via, 293 S.E.2d 442 (W. Va. 1982); Mason County Bd. of Educ. v. State Superintendent of Schools, 274 S.E.2d 435, 439 (W. Va. 1981); Trimboli v. Wayne County Bd. of Educ.,
254 S.E.2d at 566.
108 Wilt v. Flanigan, 294 S.E.2d at 189.
'07 Leef v. Via, 293 S.E.2d 442 (W. Va. 1982).
104

108 Id.

,09 School personnel regulations and state laws are to be strictly construed in favor of the
employee. State ex rel. Wilson v. Truby, 281 S.E.2d 231 (W. Va. 1981); Wayne County Bd. of
Educ. v. Tooley, 276 S.E.2d 826 (W. Va. 1981); Morgan v. Pizzino, 256 S.E.2d 592 (W. Va. 1979).
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ument each step taken in the evaluation process or risk reversal of its decision
on appeal.
Although one may question the wisdom of setting education policy in the
courtroom, the beneficial effects of the Trimboli line of cases must be acknowledged. The court's decisions not only force school officials to make more constructive use of evaluations, but they also insure that the professional educator
is not the victim of an erroneous decision about the level of her capabilities. A
teacher, it must be remembered, makes a substantial investment of time and
resources into becoming a member of her profession. The skills she learns and
nurtures are unique to her craft in the same way that a doctor's or lawyer's
skills are unique. Once denied the license to practice her profession, the
teacher cannot move freely into the private sector to a job of equal pay and
prestige, because her skills are non-transferable.
For these reasons, a teacher facing expulsion from her profession because
of incompetence deserves, minimally, a fair evaluation and a system of procedures designed to produce a correct judgment. The standards announced in
Trimboli and subsequent cases, do little more than insure that school boards
tread slowly and cautiously when deciding the professional fate of a teacher.
Admittedly, local prerogatives must be compromised to accomodate the extra
procedural safeguards. But, 0given the substantial personal interests at stake,
11
this diminution is justified.

C. ProceduralProtections Summarized
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has been particularly sensitive to the procedural rights of teachers facing any form of disciplinary action.
The court has imposed a set of safeguards which exceed the threshold requirements of due process in an apparent effort to protect teachers against damaging judgments about their competency or moral character.111 Where school officials have deviated even slightly from these safeguards, the court has reversed

Where the facts give rise to several interpretations, the issues must be resolved in favor of the
employee. Id.
110This reasoning explains why the court insists upon strict adherence to Education Policy
No. 5300(6)(a) when teacher employment interests are threatened, but it does not adequately explain the same protections for non-professionals. After all, this latter group possesses skills which
are easily transferable to the private sector and which have been acquired at a fraction of the costs
of a teaching certificate.
Perhaps the answer lies in the approach the court has taken when reviewing dismissals in the
private sector. In a series of recent cases, Harless v. First National Bank of Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d
270 (W. Va. 1978); Shanholtz v. Monongahela Power Co., 270 S.E.2d 178 (W. Va. 1980); and Stanley v. Sewell Coal Co., 285 S.E.2d 679 (W. Va. 1981), the court has revealed its displeasure with the
common law principle that employees not under contract serve at the will of their employer. The
court is moving in the direction of repudiating the "at will" doctrine in favor of a standard that
recognizes employment, even in the private sector, as an important right which should only be
deprived for cause. The "teacher cases" are merely the cutting edge of a movement toward a recognition of a right to work.
See Wilt v. Flanigan, 294 S.E.2d 189 (W. Va. 1982); Trimboli v. Board of Educ., 254 S.E.2d
561 (W. Va. 1979).
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any decision adverse to the teacher and restored her full employment rights.112
Even in cases where the officials' action was otherwise justified and executed in
substantial compliance with due process, the court has nevertheless insisted
that the letter of the law be followed and taken the side of the educator. " In
practical terms, the supreme court has effectively transformed these procedural
safeguards into substantive rights. A teacher, then, can challenge not only the
correctness of any disciplinary decision, but also the manner in which it was
made. This increases the grounds the teacher can assert in any later court action to overturn the board's decision and also insures an expanded judicial role
in educational matters.
1. Tenured Teachers
Tenured teachers have a substantial property interest in their employment.1" This interest may not be denied, under West Virginia law and the
United States Consitution, without providing minimal due process protections,
including notice of the pending decision, a statement of the charges and an
opportunity to be heard before final action is taken. 115 The notice requirement
can only be met by providing the teacher with sufficient information to prepare
a meaningful defense.116 If specific allegations of misconduct form the basis of
the board's action, the teacher is entitled to a listing of the allegedly odious
conduct.1 27 If the charges outline a continuing course of misconduct which
would prove burdensome, if not impossible, to document, then the notice can
be more general." 8 At the hearing stage, the teacher is entitled to present evidence on her behalf, to confront witnesses who have given adverse testimony
and to have retained counsel present. She is also assured that a record of the
proceeding will be developed in the event the decision is appealed. 9
If the decision of the school board is adverse, the teacher has several avenues of appeal. She may seek immediate review by the circuit court of the
county in which she was employed and, from there, apply for certiorarito the
state supreme court.120 Alternatively, she may seek an administrative appeal to
the state superintendent of schools if the adverse decision by the local board
was by less than unanimous vote.1 21 Once the state superintendent has rendered his decision upholding or setting aside the action taken on the local
Id.
Wilt v. Flanigan, 294 S.E.2d at 193.
114 Mason County Bd. of Educ. v. State Superintendent of Schools, 234 S.E.2d 321 (W. Va.
I's
11s

1977).

115 See generally, Roth v. Board of Regents, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); see also W. VA.
2-2 (1977); North v. Board of Regents, 233 S.E.2d 411 (W. Va. 1977).

CODF-§

18A-

Clarke v. Board of Regents, 279 S.E.2d 169 (W. Va. 1981).
In Snyder v. Civil Service Comm'n, 238 S.E.2d 842 (W. Va. 1977), the court made it clear
that every public employee is entitled to notice of the specific behavior which gave rise to the
discharge decision. This obviously applies to teachers with a protectable property interest in their
employment.
", Clarke v. Board of Regents, 279 S.E.2d 169 (W. Va. 1981).
119North v. Board of Regents, 233 S.E.2d 411 (W. Va. 1977).
120 Beverlin v. Board of Educ. of Lewis County, 216 S.E.2d 554 (W. Va. 1975).
"' Leef v. Via, 293 S.E.2d 442 (W. Va. 1982).
116
117
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level, the teacher may petition for circuit court review in the appropriate
county.'22 The supreme court has2 made
it clear that the appeal to the state
3
superintendent is not mandatory.

2. Non-Tenured Teachers
The procedural protections afforded a probationary teacher differ from
those available to her tenured colleague in several respects. First, a probationary teacher is not entitled to prior notice of a board decision allowing her contract to lapse. 124 She does receive formal notice of the board's action after the
fact, but she must then request a statement of reasons and an opportunity for
a hearing to gain reconsideration of the decision. 1 s2 Second, a probationary
teacher is not entitled to have retained counsel present at the hearing stage.1 2 6
Of course, the parties may agree to permit counsel at the hearing, but the court
127
has indicated, in an analagous case, that such an agreement is not obligatory.
Finally, a probationary teacher whose contract is not renewed must appeal that
decision to the state superintendent of schools before seeking judicial relief.2 s
If she is dissatisfied with the administrative relief ordered by the superintendent, she may then apply for a writ of certiorariwith the appropriate circuit
court.2 29 But, she cannot bypass the superintendent and go directly to the
courts, as can her tenured associates."30
State ex rel. Bd. of Educ. v. Martin, 112 W. Va. 174, 163 S.E. 850 (1932).
The court's position on the by-pass of the superintendent seems at odds with the common
law duty to exhaust administrative remedies. It is well-settled in West Virginia that administrative
relief must be exhausted before invoking the jurisdiction of the courts. McGrady v. Callaghan, 244
S.E.2d 793 (W. Va. 1978). The exhaustion requirement is not discretionary. Failure to vigorously
pursue administrative relief, where made available by statute or regulations having the force of
law, is a jurisdictional bar to a court's consideration of the case. Daurelle v. Traders Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n., 143 W. Va. 674, 104 S.E.2d 320 (1958). The Supreme Court of Appeals has recognized
exceptions to the exhaustion requirement, but only in limited and well-defined circumstances.
These circumstances include: (1) cases where the constitutionality of the statute is challenged; (2)
controversies that are outside the jurisdiction of the administrative agency; and (3) suits where
delay will result in irreparable harm to the plaintiff. State ex rel. Arnold v. Egnor, 275 S.E.2d 15
(W. Va. 1981). The case of discharged teachers would not seem to fit nicely into any of these
categories of exceptions, yet the court continues to allow complete circumvention of the established administrative network.
124 W. VA. CODE § 18A-2-8(a) (Supp. 1982): The post-decision hearing process provided by the
legislature seems to run afoul of the supreme court's ruling in North v. Board of Regents, 233
S.E.2d 411 (W. Va. 1977), where the court held that due process protections must be afforded
before the deprivation occurs, unless a compelling state interest justifies the precipitous decision.
125 W. VA. CoDE § 18A-2-8(a) (Supp. 1982).
126 In State ex rel. McLendon v. Morton, 249 S.E.2d 919 (W. Va. 1978), the court held that
the presence of legal counsel was not required when a college professor challenges an adverse tenure decision at a hearing before school officials. Presumably, this curious rule would also control in
the public school setting.
122
'23

127

Id.

1"

Leef v. Via, 293 S.E.2d 442 (1982).

129

Id.

The court was silent in Leef v. Via on whether an appeal to the State Superintendent from
a decision not to renew her contract was mandatory. If the court applies the common law rule on
"administrative exhaustion," a probationary teacher will have to go to the superintendent to perfect her right to challenge any adverse decision in court.
130
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Apart from these three minor differences, the distinction between tenured
and probationary teachers has been blurred by the supreme court's recent decisions. Where important employment rights are in jeopardy, the court has
looked past the labels in deciding what procedural rights the teacher enjoys. Its
decisions have undoubtedly created additional administrative burdens on
school boards, as well as further eroded local discretion in dealing with personnel matters. But the court has apparently determined that this trade-off is necessary to adequately protect the job interests of educators.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The underlying inconsistencies in West Virginia's position on collective
bargaining has blackened the relationship between school boards and teachers.
Understandably, these groups are confused about the reach of their legal rights
and the confines of their legal duties. Confusion, in turn, has bred inaction on
the part of school boards and impatience on the part of teachers, leaving important problems affecting the quality of education unresolved. As conditions
between these two groups worsen, the danger exists that educators will have
little choice but to harden their demands and to become more militant in their
actions. Militancy, in this context, is merely a euphemism for what officials
fear most-strikes by public school teachers; strikes which would not only
erode public confidence in educational institutions, but disrupt the learning
process for the system's intended beneficiaries.
The bright spots for educators in this building confrontation have been
provided by the state supreme court. Its decisions on teacher competency and
morality are particularly noteworthy, because they provide both sides clear directions on the responsibilities they are expected to assume in the educational
process. But much more remains to be done if order and structure are to rule
the relations between school boards and teachers; and, unfortunately, the court
is institutionally limited in the role it can play. As Justice Miller said in City of
Fairmont v. Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, "the complex
issues in this field [labor relations] are ill-suited to any comprehensive judicial
solution.' 13 1 Where, then, does one look for the required leadership? The answer must be, to the state legislature. It is that body which is charged with the
constitutional duty of providing a system of public education; and, ultimately,
it is only that body which can marshal the necessary resources to accomplish
the task of formalizing the employment relationship between educators and
school officials.
William Flanigan

11

285 S.E.2d at 595.
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